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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Petitioner appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post
conviction relief which follows a remand to the district court from a prior appeal of
its summary dismissal. The issue is very narrow and is whether the court erred
when it held that Mr. Hyer, who was incarcerated out of state, failed in his burden
of showing that he did not have access to Idaho legal materials and thus the
statute of limitations would not be equitably tolled.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The background of this matter is explained by the Court of Appeals in its
unpublished opinion in the prior appeal, Hyer v. State, docket no. 36802 (Ct.App.
10/29/2010) (unpublished):
In the underlying criminal case, Hyer pied guilty to one count of
lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen pursuant to a plea
agreement. l.C. § 18-1508. Hyer entered the agreement in
exchange for the state dismissing three counts of possession of
sexually exploitative material. The district court imposed a unified
twenty-year sentence, with six years determinate. Hyer challenged
the sentence through an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion arguing
that he "received two addenda to his presentence investigation
report (PSI), which he was unaware of at the time his sentence was
imposed." The district court granted a hearing on the Rule 35
motion and subsequently entered a written order affirming the
original sentence. Hyer appealed and this Court vacated his
judgment of conviction and remanded the case to the district court
for resentencing at a proceeding in which Hyer was in attendance.
Following remand, the district court re-entered judgment.
More than four years after the re-entered judgment of conviction,
Hyer filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging: (1)
ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) violation of his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; and (3) denial of
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"fundamental fairness embedded in the Fourteenth Amendment
due process clause." In addition, Hyer filed a motion for
appointment of counsel. The district court granted Hyer's request
for counsel, and also issued a notice of intent to dismiss all claims
except for one claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The
district court subsequently entered an order summarily dismissing
Hyer's petition after receiving no response from Hyer. Hyer then
filed a motion for reconsideration through counsel pursuant to Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Hyer's post-conviction counsel
submitted an affidavit in support of the motion in which he stated
that he and Hyer were in disagreement over which claims should
be pursued. Hyer's counsel acknowledged that he had not complied
with the district court's notice, but asked the court to find good
cause or excusable neglect for his noncompliance. The district
court determined that the disagreement between Hyer and his
counsel did not justify the failure to file a timely response and
denied the motion to reconsider. Hyer appeals from both the
summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as well
as the denial of the motion for reconsideration.
Id., p. 1-2.

The Court of Appeals reversed in part, finding that the district court erred
by not providing proper notice before it dismissed his claim that his trial counsel
failed to file an appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id., p. 7.
Back in the district court, the state moved for summary dismissal and filed
a memorandum in support, raising the affirmative defense of the statute of
limitations and asserting that the petition was untimely filed. (R. p. 9, 11-15.)
The court ultimately dismissed the petition on timeliness grounds. (R. p.
66-68.)
Petitioner timely appeals. (R. p. 70.)
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ISSUE
Whether the district court erred when it summarily denied the post conviction
relief petition as untimely.
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ARGUMENT

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT SUMMARILY DENIED THE POSTCONVICTION RELIEF PETITION AS UNTIMELY

A.

Standard of Review
"Our review of the district court's construction and application of the time

limitations aspects of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act is a matter of
free review." Kriebel v. State, 148 Idaho 188 (Ct.App. 2009).

B.

The Timeliness Arguments and the Court's Rulings
First of all, it was undisputed below that the statute of limitations ran on

April 6, 2006, but Mr. Hyer's petition for post conviction relief was not filed until
April 20, 2009.
In the affidavit of facts in support of post conviction petition, Mr. Hyer
explained that in 2005 he was unexpectedly transferred out of Idaho to the
correctional facility in Appleton, Minnesota, until he was again transferred to the
correctional facility in Littlefield, Texas. (R. 36802, p, 12. 1)

His affidavit

continued:
While housed in the out of state correctional institutions, petitioner
had no meaningful access to courts, adequate law library or
materials for developing legal claims, nor available assistance from
any person trained in the law. Petitioner further asserts his
ignorance to [sic] the law and its recourse for remedies.
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This citation is to the record in the original appeal, of which the Supreme
Court took judicial notice pursuant to an order issued March 26, 2012. (R. p. 2.)
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Petitioner was returned to the Idaho prison from Texas in January
of 2009 where he had a reasonable access to the Idaho court and
acceptable law library to develop his claims.
Affidavit of Facts (internal paragraph numbering omitted). (R. 36802, p. 12.)
Attached thereto was an (IDOC) offender profile which indicated that he
went to Minnesota on October 24, 2005, and then Texas on May 30, 2006, and
was returned to Idaho on January 4, 2009. (R. 36802, p. 22.)
As explained by the court in its Order Dismissing Petition for Post
Conviction Relief, Mr. Hyer relied on the above affidavit and did not put on any
more evidence regarding the matter at the hearing following the remand on the
timeliness question. (R. p. 67.)
At the hearing, the court asked appointed counsel whether Mr. Hyer had
the ability to file a petition during the first eight months of his incarceration which
occurred in Idaho. (Tr. p. 4.) Appointed counsel answered that she believed it
was a possibility, but that would have meant that for just this particular defendant,
the statute of limitations was only eight months, as opposed to one year for
everyone else. (Tr. p. 4.)
The court then asked whether there was computer access in the Texas
facility. (Tr. p. 4-5.) Counsel answered "no." (Tr. p. 5.)
The state then explained that while Mr. Hyer was transported to Minnesota
during the year and 42-day period following the re-entry of the judgment, he was
there the entire time until after the statute of limitations ran, so what was
available in Texas was irrelevant to the question currently before the court. (Tr. p.
5-6.)

The state agreed that he was in the Appleton, Minnesota, Prairie
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Correctional facility from October 2005 until the expiration of the statute of
limitations. (Tr. p. 6.)
The state basically argued that the eight months prior to his being
transferred was enough time, and his intelligence level and background did not
indicate there was some reason he couldn't have filed a petition in the eight
months. (Tr. p. 7-9.)
The court's ruling was as follows in its Order Dismissing Petition for Post
Conviction Relief:
.... Mr. Hyer did not file his petition until approximately four years
after that date. Furthermore, Mr. Hyer has not met his burden of
coming forward to show that he did not have access to Idaho legal
materials. While his affidavit filed in conjunction with his petition for
post-conviction relief asserts that he did not have access to
adequate materials to develop his claim, he did not present any
evidence whatsoever as to what legal materials, if any, he did have
access to. The Court finds Mr. Hyer's bald assertion inadequate to
meet his burden of showing a lack of access to Idaho legal
materials. Thus, this Court cannot find that there are grounds to
equitably toll the statute of limitations in this case. Consequently,
the Court finds that Mr. Hyer's petition was not timely filed and that
it must be dismissed.
Order at p. 2-3 (emphasis added). (R. p. 67-68.)

C.

The Court Erred in Summarilv Denying the Petition as Untimely
Appellant asserts that the district court erred when it held that Mr. Hyer's

sworn statement in his affidavit that he did not have adequate legal resources
while incarcerated out of state was not sufficient to met his burden of showing he
had inadequate legal materials.

Contrary to the court's complaint, it was not a

bald assertion.
First of all, the assertion was more complex than the court acknowledges.
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He did not just say that the legal resources at the Minnesota facility were not
adequate for developing legal claims as suggested by the court. (R. p. 67.)

He

was more specific, stating that there were no adequate materials or adequate law
library for developing legal claims, nor available assistance from any person
trained in the law.
Second, there was no controverting evidence from the state. The state
conceded that Mr. Hyer was not housed in Idaho during the relevant time. More
to the point, it did not controvert in any way that the legal resources in Minnesota
were inadequate or suggest that they were adequate. Rather, its argument was
that Mr. Hyer should have been able to prepare his petition in Idaho before he
was transferred. 2
Third, the filing of the petition shortly after his return to Idaho where he
says he had adequate resources corroborates that the out of state resources
were not adequate, or else he would have earlier filed it. 3
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As an aside since the court did not base its ruling on this, to hold that Mr.
Hyer had adequate time to file the petition before he was transferred would
basically mean that he should have somehow anticipated that the statutory
limitations period would be cut down not by a few days, but almost in half, and so
should have filed his petition long before the statute said it was due. But an after
the fact requirement that an action be filed well before the statute of limitations
runs is contrary to the very purpose of a statute of limitations which establishes
the last point in which an action can be timely filed with no obligation to file it
sooner. In short, it is just not how much time for which a petitioner had access to
Idaho law which matters, it also matters when that time is in relation to the
deadline.
3

This is why the state was incorrect that the inadequacy of the Texas
resources was irrelevant. Also, it goes to how long the statute of limitations
should be tolled.
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Finally, the court relies heavily on Mr. Hyer's use of the word "adequate."
However, a failure to explain what legal resources were available does not
somehow make them adequate or controvert his statement that they were not
adequate. Had he simply said there were no materials, this presumably would
have satisfied the court. But the use of the word "adequate" does not necessarily
mean there were some materials available, a complete absence of something
can also be described as not adequate.
While of course the Petitioner has to meet his burden, he would have no
reason to know that whether he could proceed with his petition or not would
essentially be determined by his use of the word "adequate." Therefore, if the
court was going to so heavily rely on that word choice, it should have just asked
what he meant during the hearing where it asked other questions, rather than not
asking and dismissing the petition because the information it desired was not
volunteered.

CONCLUSION
Wherefore,

for the

reasons

as

stated

above,

Appellant/Petitioner

respectfully requests that the district court's summary denial of the post
conviction petition be reversed and that this matter be remanded for an
evidentiary hearing.
DATED this ? 7 a y of August, 2012.
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